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RECENT DECISION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC SUPPORT OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS.-
The recent case of Harist v. Hoegen 1 raises the long contested and
difficult problem of the application of state funds to sectarian or paro-
chial schools. Action was brought by parents by way of an injunction
to prevent state funds being expended for parochial school purposes.
Some ten years prior to the commencement of this action the parish
school of St. Cecelia in the town of Meta had been taken into the public
school system. Most of the citizens of the district were members of the
Roman Catholic Religion. The school day was interspersed with the
usual religious elements common to the Catholic parochial school, morn-
ing prayer, Mass, religious instruction, weekly confession and the teach-
ing of religion as a formal course for which credit was given. The
present contest arose on the consolidation of another school district
with the Meta district. The plaintiffs contend that the defendant,
school board, is maintaining a parochial school at public expense, con-
trary to the Constitution of Missouri. The chancellor did not enjoin
the maintenance of the parochial school at public expense, nor the pay-
ment of public funds to the teachers of religion; and it is from that
decision that the plaintiffs appealed.
The Constitution of Missouri 2 provided that: "Neither the General
Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school district or other
municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or pay from
any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed, church
or sectarian purpose, or to fielp to support or sustain any private or
public school, academy, seminary, college, university or other institu-
tion of learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian
denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal
property or real estate ever be made by the State, or any county, city,
town or other municipal corporation, for any religious creed, church or
sectarian purpose whatever." It was argued that the school was con-
trolled by the school board and not by the Church. However the court
reasoned that the control by the school board was but a nominal one,
designed only for the purpose of evading that which the Constitution
forbids. A further provision of the Constitution of Missouri 3 how-
ever, provided: "That no money shall ever be taken from the public
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomina-
tion of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher
thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any dis-
crimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any
1 163 S. W. (2d) 609 (Mo., July, 1942).
2 Article XI, Section 11.
s Article II, Section 7.
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form of religious faith or worship." In the face of such constitutional
prohibitions the decision of the Supreme Court in granting the injunc-
tive relief prayed for is easily explainable. The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri realized the rather embarrassing situation in which it was placed.
It spoke very highiy of parochial education, in the same paragraphs
that it cut off the means of maintaining such an institution.
Citing the Supreme Court of the United States in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,4 which had spoken of parochial schools as being "long re-
garded as useful aid meritorious," the Supreme Court of Missouri went
on with praise for the great secular institutions of learning and the
great need in these times of spiritual training for the young. We can
not from the language infer whether this adulatory method was only a
means of facilitating what may have been a predisposition to grant the
injunctive relief; but the court ,saves 'itself by a resort to what we are
disposed to call "legajties." "The question confronting us," the court
said, "is one only (italics mine) of law; of upholding our Constitution
as it is written which, as lawyers and judges, we have dedicated our
professional life to do." The court also pointed to a public policy that
dictated such a decision; whereby with so-called preferences given to
no religious sect, society is saved the political strifes and contentions
that inevitably result when such a condition seemingly exists. The
legal position of the Missouri Supreme Court is no doubt unassailable.
However, it seems that a Christian social policy is overlooked.
The situation presented is not new nor is the decision unexpected in
the light of similar decisions involving religious liberty and the collateral
problem of state funds for parochial school purposes. In Knowlton v.
Baumhover 5 for instance, it was the contention of the plaintiffs that
the parochial school involved, although it had a public school character,
had become sectarian by reason of the various religious elements mak-
ing up the school day and that the defendants, in their official capacity,
were unlawfully appropriating public funds to the support of such insti-
tutions. The trial court's finding that injunction should be granted to
the plaintiff against the appropriation of such public funds was affirmed.
The court pointed out that to constitute a sectarian school it need not
necessarily be shown that the school was devoted wholly to religious or
sectarian teaching. The court made reference to the case of State ex rel.
Weiss v. School Board 6 wherein the reading of the Bible constituted
the school's conduct and dedication to religious teaching. The court
observed: "The mere fact that only a small fraction of the school hours
is devoted to such worship in no way justifies such use against an ob-
jecting taxpayer. If the right be conceded, then the length of time so
devoted becomes a matter of discretion. If such right does not exist,
4 268 U. S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573, 69 L. ed. 1070, 39 A. L. R. 468 (1925).
5 182 Ia. 691, 166 N. W. 202, 5 A. L. R. 841 (1918).
6 76 Wis. 177, 7 L. R. A. 330, 20 Am. St. Rep. 41, 44 N. W. 967 (1890).
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then any length of time, however short, is forbidden. The relators as
taxpayers of the district were compelled to aid in the erection of the
school building in question and also to aid in the support of the school
maintained therein ..... Being thus compelled ..... they have a legal
right to object to its being used as 'a place of worship.' "
The latter case recalls a similar case, Wilkerson v. Rome,7 also in-
volving the reading of the Bible, which was proscribed by an ordinance
of the city of Rome, to be read in the public school. Action under this
ordinance was strenuously objected to particularly by members of the
Roman Catholic Faith and members of the Jewish religion, whose chil-
dren were in attendance at such school. The Constitution of Georgia, s
like similar constitutional provisions in other states, provided that:
"No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any Church, sect, or denomination of religionists,
or of any sectarian institution." The court decided that the reading
of extracts from the Bible was not a violation of any constitutional
provision; therefore that the reading of the Bible did not make it a
sectarian school. The court cited Donahoe v. Richards 9 which had
observed as follows: "Reading the Bible is no more an interference
with religious belief than would reading the mythology of Greece or
Rome be regarded as interfering with religious belief or an affirmance
of the pagan creeds. A chapter in the Koran might be read, yet it
would not be an affirmation of the truth of Mohammedanism, or an
interference with religious faith." In this regard it might be asked
why the Bible should be read at all and why some other book or a
novel perhaps might just as well be read in its place. The same view
was taken in this case as was followed in First M. E. Church v. At-
lanta 10 which held that the reading of the Bible in the public schools
did not convert the school into a sectarian institution. Perhaps in
those early days the public attitude was not so adverse and repugnant
to anything that pertained to religion in the schools. It is a subject
of question why we should change our attitude in a situation such as is
presented in the Harfst Case."
Leo L. Linck.
7 152 Ga. 762, 110 S. E. 895, 20 A. L. R. 1334 (1922).
8 Article 1, Section i, 14 Civ. Code 1910, No. 6370.
9 38 Me. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 256 (1854).
10 76 Ga. 181 (Ga., 1886).
11 163 S. W. (2d) 609 (Mo., July, 1942).
